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Where happiness varies: Recalling Adam Smith to critically assess the UK 
government project Measuring National Well-being 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper provides a constructive critique of the work on the Office for National Statistic’s 
Measuring National Well-being project. Recalling Adam Smith’s work on happiness highlights 
how the work in this project, as well as most of the dominant work in the field remains 
based on an economic utility model of well-being, failing to distinguish between individual- 
and aggregate-based levels of analysis and continuing to postulate well-being as a form of 
utility that essentially is the outcome of market interactions only. Using data from the first 
wave of Understanding Society, this paper will investigate the appropriateness of the 
approach empirically. A breakdown of the variation in life-satisfaction shows that ranking a 
split of the UK into 36 regions has little meaning, as there is hardly any variation of life-
satisfaction at the regional level. Using multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA), an 
alternative way of engaging with the cross-regional analysis is presented. 
 
Keywords: Subjective well-being, Happiness, Measurement, Adam Smith, Office for National 
Statistics (ONS), Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) 
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Two decades of happiness research achieved impact beyond academic discourses. In several 
countries projects have been undertaken to decide on new sets of measures to evaluate the 
quality of life taking into account a greater variety of indicators than those relying only on 
GDP and related concepts. Amongst others, countries as dissimilar as Bhutan, with its gross-
national happiness project (CBS 2011), and France, having commissioned the famed Stiglitz-
report (Stiglitz et al. 2009), declared that policy shall be oriented towards improving lives of 
people in economic and non-economic ways.  
 
Most importantly, well-being was not only defined in economic terms, but also did it not just 
reflect the use of objective indicators. Acknowledging that different people may perceive 
changes in certain objective life-circumstances in different ways and that therefore their 
well-being may be affected differently, too, the concept of subjective well-being has gained a 
prominent place in the discussion. Comprehensive analyses of well-being now tend to take 
into account subjective evaluations by people about their well-being. These can be based on 
hedonic approaches, focusing on the prevalence of good over bad moods (Kahnemann 1999) 
and are found in a large variety of studies based in psychological research (Parducci 1995), 
usually measured through experience sampling methods (Scollon et al. 2003). Alternatively 
subjective well-being can be approached as a cognitive concept in which individuals explicitly 
evaluate their happiness or satisfaction with a particular domain or life as a whole (Schwarz 
and Strack 1999). This approach is particularly prominent in survey-based research, which 
lends itself easily to investigations relevant for country- or regional-level analysis, often 
complementary to objective measures (Frey 2008). Furthermore eudaimonic approaches to 
understanding subjective well-being are more process-oriented and aim to conceptualise 
how people lead their lives instead of focussing on particular hedonic or cognitive outcomes 
(Ryff & Keyes 1995), usually with an emphasis on self-determination and autonomy  (Ryan 
et al. 2008).   
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In 2010 the government of the United Kingdom joined these efforts and commissioned a 
project to the Office for National Statistics (ONS) aimed at the development of more 
comprehensive measures of national well-being, explicitly including subjective indicators 
(ONS 2010). The project is of considerable effort, making use of public discussion events and 
an online-survey based consultation.  What appears to be rather progressive at first sight 
requires a more careful look however. Subjective well-being is not a concept that can only be 
used in one particular way. Its subjective nature makes it impossible and undesirable to 
understand it as a uniformly applying idea that could not be employed through different 
frameworks with varying assumptions and implications associated with them.  
 
This paper aims to highlight that the ONS project indeed favours a particularised notion of 
subjective well-being. It will be argued that while widening the concept of well-being with 
the inclusion of subjective measures, the application thereof remains based on the premise 
of economic utility as the research and analyses presented by the ONS illustrate. This reflects 
a choice of a particular approach that is not without alternatives, though it often is portrayed 
as such. The relationship between utility and subjective well-being could be understood in 
different ways however, where the latter is not assumed as synonymous or the outcome of 
particular utility functions. Such an understanding distinguishing between happiness and 
utility explicitly is not actually a new idea. Approaches championing a comprehensive 
engagement with subjectivity affecting well-being have been proposed by Adam Smith in his 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (1790/2009) more than two centuries ago. His work already 
points to the importance of considering that happiness and well-being may be constituted 
differently for different groups of people in the first place and that mere comparisons of 
face-value levels thereof can be misleading. It is worth recalling his comprehensive work to 
provide a framework to identity concerns with the ONS project to better understand how we 
can use data from it for genuinely meaningful investigations. 
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Measuring National Well-being in the United Kingdom 
 
Taking subjectivity seriously: the role of utility 
Thanks to happiness research the acceptance for subjective elements in well-being 
definitions beyond those related to economic indicators has grown substantially. The ONS 
(see for example Waldron 2010) does not fail to acknowledge this in their working papers 
providing the review for the project. However, while subjective well-being has been 
integrated into many studies, this is usually in the form of experienced utility (Kahnemann 
1997). Utility is understood as the personal benefit gained by an individual from a particular 
interaction or a particular behaviour (in particular in the market place). It is acknowledged by 
these works and the ONS reports that utility is not just derived from market interactions (as 
proposed by orthodox microeconomic models; Bruni & Porta 2005: 9) but can be measured 
meaningfully by subjective well-being measures in conjunction with objective measures. 
While this reflects an extension of research methodology, most studies (including those cited 
by the ONS) largely retain the general economic model of market interactions (as well as 
social interactions modeled in market terms) and utility. Utility is defined as something that 
has a subjective component attributed to the individual, but the place of this subjectivity in 
the model remains the same: it is the outcome of effectively market interactions (Spence et 
al. 2011; Evans 2011). This is somewhat paradoxical as these models do not actually reflect 
an influence of the subjective preferences on the decision making in the first place, but 
largely analyse the subjective differences as outcomes of actions taken or circumstances 
persons are found to be in. The economic models do not change, only the estimation of the 
utility function does through the measurement of a subjective evaluation. An approach 
taking subjectivity seriously in a genuine way on the other hand would begin by asking why 
and how different individuals or groups of people construct their subjective understanding of 
well-being in the first place. Utility-driven approaches however use subjective well-being in a 
more simplistic way: as long as it is measured consistently (for example through a survey 
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question), the interest is in correlating it to other measures (for example income) and to 
make summary statements about their relationship. A subjective approach would initially 
investigate whether such an analysis would be meaningful in the first place and challenge a 
simplistic approach if different groups of people define what they mean by subjective well-
being differently. 
 
Several contemporary researchers have called into question the applicability of orthodox 
utility models (Frey & Stutzer 2002: i) attempting to model behaviours as ultimately 
determined post-hoc following an objective demand and supply driven interaction (Frey 
2008). However, the debate about this issue is actually not a new one. While the derived 
utility approach loosely follows ideas proposed by Jeremy Bentham on how to conceptualise 
utility (1789/1996), it is often overlooked that Adam Smith developed a contrasting approach 
prior Bentham. Smith unfortunately is often misrepresented as early champion of liberal 
market economies without state intervention assuming that selfish motivations are the only 
drivers of human interaction. While Smith talks about the merits of markets and 
specialisation in the famed Wealth of Nations (1776/1999), it would be a gross simplification 
and inaccurate to portray his thinking solely grounded on a small selection of the writing in 
this particular book (Rasmussen 2006; Smith 1998; Tribe 1999). Even in the Wealth of 
Nations (1776/1999), Smith discusses processes of human interaction that are not based on 
self-interested individuals resulting in the necessity for state institutions’ active engagement. 
Self-interest is an important factor in Smith’s work, however it is not the enabler of every 
activity. It creates the rationale for exchange and therefore provides the foundation for a 
division of labour and the enhancement of productivity. Smith never argues though, that 
self-interest alone determines what choices individuals make. On the contrary, he explicitly 
suggests that individuals may often choose a path of action that does not lead to the 
maximisation of their utility, because their concerns for norms and the well-being of others 
matter to them when taking decisions (1790/2009: 18, 31, 44, 47, 49). 
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While Smith presents self-interest as relevant and beneficial, in particular with regards to the 
spirit of entrepreneurship and the material well-being that can be created through it (192), 
he also stipulates that economic success and happiness are not synonymous (251). 
Happiness is considered to be conceptually different from wealth (73, 215). Both are 
important, but they should come in combination. Based on their experiences individuals are 
able to evaluate their current situation and anticipate what effects their choices may have for 
their happiness in the future (20, 23, 56, 59) – a conceptualisation very similar to the 
contemporary happiness research notion of cognitive evaluations of life-satisfaction 
(Veenhoven 1984). Smith consequentially stipulates that well-being does not simply depend 
on objectively determined exchanges in market interactions. The subjective evaluations 
individuals make within this framework, depending both on the societal setting and their 
personal circumstances are not merely post-hoc realisations. On the contrary, Smith argues 
explicitly for a reversed order to the mechanism stipulated in the economic understanding of 
utility: personal preference or taste, based on subjective experiences and resulting 
anticipations regarding happiness partially determine what choices people will make 
(1790/2009: 26). Preferences therefore are not derived from utility, but pre-suppose it. 
Forms of subjective well-being must therefore not simply be treated as outcomes of other 
processes of which we may want to compare levels for different groups of people as done in 
most of the ONS papers cited. Instead, subjective well-being as an outcome has to be 
distinguished from subjective well-being as a motivating and driving factor that determines 
the interactions we may wish to analyse. A simplistic utility-driven approach sees the level of 
subjective well-being of a person as the result of a range of prior characteristics. A different 
approach emphasising variations in constructions of subjective well-being would investigate 
how differences in how the ways that certain individuals constitute their understanding of 
well-being may affect their behavioural decisions in the first place. It allows for decisions to 
not be based on “objective” indicators, such as education, income, age and similar socio-
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demographic characteristics, alone. Instead it enables us to conceptualise how differences in 
decisions may also be based on different personal preferences based on a range of 
socialising influences. Traditional utility approaches cannot cater for this. The way the ONS 
reports suggest we engage with subjective well-being measures focuses on utility 
approaches however: They correlate objective factors with their measures of subjective well-
being,1 but at no point suggest that it would be meaningful to engage with the question 
whether differences in the construction of well-being affect the validity and 
comprehensiveness of those analyses. They therefore frame the usage of the data they 
produce in a utility-driven way.  
 
Society ≠ Sum of its parts 
 
Ignoring the differences between these SWB conceptualisations has substantial 
consequences for the approach to further analyses, the indicators employed in them and the 
framing of the findings that can be achieved. Most importantly, relying on the orthodox 
approach to positioning utility, leads to an understanding of societal subjective well-being (at 
any level of aggregation) as the sum of individual amounts of subjective well-being. 
Following this approach it does not matter whether relationships between certain factors and 
subjective well-being are found at the individual or any aggregate level, as they are assumed 
to be equivalent in character. The ONS working papers do not distinguish between 
individual-level centred and aggregate-level based studies, but rather mix indicators of well-
being at different levels without properly engaging with the analytical issues that arise from 
this. See for example Beaumont (2011) combining individual level measures, such as 
personal satisfaction with one’s partner and overall neighbourhood satisfaction rates without 
considering whether satisfaction evaluations at the individual level have to be distinguished 
conceptually from satisfaction evaluations at the aggregate level. This is only feasible as an 
approach if individual and aggregate models of subjective well-being are conceptually 
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equivalent. Should this equivalence not exist however, conclusions drawn from work relying 
on these assumptions would be flawed and policy recommendations potentially misleading, 
as factors may be identified as relevant that would be operating differently at the individual 
or societal level respectively. Such a finding would require the use of multi-level analysis 
structures – currently not taken into account in the design of suggested indicators by the 
ONS (Evans 2011). In such an approach variables reflecting individual-level and context-level 
would both be considered as well, but their interplay would be carefully analysed to answer 
questions about whether particular factors operate in the same way at the individual level as 
they do on the aggregate level or whether context factors may even affect individual-level 
ones (for example Eichhorn (2012b) has confirmed findings about personal unemployment 
having a substantial negative effect on personal life-satisfaction, however country-level 
unemployment rates do not have the same robust effect on the populations of their 
countries – finding a relationship at one level does not allow to infer its existence for another 
level of aggregation). 
 
Again, Smith, expanding his work on the differentiation between wealth and happiness, 
already discussed the importance of carefully distinguishing between what appears to 
constitute well-being at the societal level and what may motivate individuals’ behaviour. 
Smith suggests that individuals may sometimes expect that a gain in wealth may inevitably 
be reflected in a similar increase in happiness (1790/2009: 52, 211). Accordingly he cautions 
of an overemphasis on wealth orientation that is disconnected from a concern into the 
domains that are responsible for happiness: 
 
 ‘This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful (...), is 
 the great and most universal cause of the corruption of  our moral sentiments.’ 
 (73) 
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While material well-being is desirable and self-interest an important element in achieving it, 
it does not reflect further aspects of well-being in a society. Smith argues that there must be 
interaction and exchange through forms of reciprocity and care for others in order for a 
society to persist and function. This can be achieved through self-interested individuals who 
support each other only because of this, but a society founded only on this principle will 
always be less happy, he stipulates, then a society in which the interest in others is a 
principle that guides individuals’ behaviour beyond self-interest (104). In a functional society, 
its members cooperate, in a happy society they do so not just for egoistic reasons, but 
because they also internalised norms related to care for others. The well-being of a society is 
therefore more than the aggregation of the utility its members have and conceptually distinct 
from individual well-being as there are determining factors at the societal level which are 
different to the factors that allow an individual to be well - both in terms of happiness and 
material wealth (103, 106, 108).  
 
Variation in well-being levels and the meaning of well-being  
 
Having seen the problems with the ONS conceptualisations of well-being through a reflection 
of the theoretical considerations of Adam Smith, we can now proceed to practically identify 
the key issues in the way the ONS suggests to use subjective well-being measures. First, we 
need to ensure that the levels of societal aggregation chosen are meaningful for the 
respectively proposed analyses. For this, substantial variation has to be found in the measure 
under consideration across the respective societally aggregated units of analyses (which has 
usually been ignored so far in the course of the development of the ONS project). This is 
crucial if one of the stipulated aims, namely the comparison between regions according to 
their levels of subjective well-being (Waldron 2010), ultimately resulting in a ranking, is to be 
meaningful. Ranking regions that differ only marginally would be of little interest.  
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Furthermore though, when engaging properly with differences in subjective orientations and 
after establishing that variation exists, it needs to be clarified what this variation precisely 
represents – something that was not discussed in the papers outlining the considerations 
used when developing the indicators (see for example Tikler & Hicks 2011). We have to be 
convinced that the well-being measures which get employed are equivalent conceptually 
across different aggregate units. Otherwise variation may represent differences in the 
composition of individuals making up particular aggregate units, systematic differences 
between these units beyond the composition or a mixture of both. If any policy 
recommendations are to be derived from research employing these concepts, the 
identification of the correct mechanisms which could be addressed, is of crucial importance.  
 
The empirical section of this paper will provide an illustration of this issue. It highlights the 
problem of arbitrarily selecting societal units for comparison using a simplistic utility-based 
approach assuming conceptual equivalence between different units of aggregation and thus 
relying on contrasting measures that merely summarise mean levels of subjective well-being. 
An illustrative example is presented to show an alternative way of engaging with the 
question of what constitutes well-being in particular regions in the UK. In doing so, it actively 
engages with the notion that well-being should be analysed in its own right first, before it is 
related to assumed objective indicators in utility-based frameworks.  
 
Data and Method  
 
The work presented here is based on the first wave of the new longitudinal UK survey 
Understanding Society (2011), which greatly extends the reach of its predecessor the British 
Household Panel Survey to including over 50,000 in the general questionnaire sample so far. 
In order to ensure sufficient sample sizes and meaningful aggregate units, the regions for 
comparison are drawn from the European standardised NUTS2 classification scheme dividing 
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the UK into 37 regions (see Table 1). Out of those only one showed too small a sample size 
to be usable (72 cases, substantially less after missing values on used variables were 
accounted for) and could therefore not be included as a comparative area in the analysis 
(UKM5: North Eastern Scotland, i.e. Aberdeen and surroundings). In all analyses, data is 
weighted by Understanding Society design weights to ensure adequate representation of the 
population.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
In order to explore the variation of life-satisfaction across those regions two analyses will be 
conducted. First, results from a variance component breakdown between the aggregate 
(regional) and the individual level permits to see the amount of variance that is attributable 
to the regional level. Second, results from an ANOVA (analysis of variance) post-hoc test will 
be discussed to show which regions are significantly different from each other in their mean 
levels of life-satisfaction. Life-satisfaction in Understanding Society is operationalized through 
the question ‘Please tick the number which you feel best describes how dissatisfied or 
satisfied you are with the following aspects of your current situation. Your life overall.’ The 
response is measured on a 7-points scale (1..7) and responses are approximately normally 
distributed, although there is of course some censoring at the upper end. However, it has 
been shown repeatedly that life-satisfaction measures on 10-point and even 4-point scales 
can be treated robustly as linear variables, in particular when applied in multi-level settings 
(Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gërxhani 2004; Pittau et al. 2010) as long as models are not over-
complicated.  
 
For the second part of the analysis a multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) 
approach will be employed.2 Two latent variables measuring different approaches to 
conceptualising well-being will be estimated to illustrate the relevance of this approach to 
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both more cognitive evaluations of domains and hedonic manifestations of subjective well-
being. The first latent variable will be based on the evaluation of the satisfaction of three 
domains (satisfaction with one’s health, the financial situation one is in and the amount of 
leisure time one has). The second one will be based on subjective evaluations of body well-
being (the results from the General Health Questionnaire distress scale, the score of the 
short Warwick-Edinburgh mental well-being scale, and a subjective evaluation of one’s own 
general health). While the first variable reflects the explicit satisfaction with different 
elements of one’s life, the second one focuses on subjective measures of one’s actual state 
of physical and mental well-being.3 Both variables are estimated simultaneously and allowed 
to correlate with each other. As one would expect, the satisfaction with one’s own health and 
the evaluation of one’s general health status are substantially correlated (with r=0.55 
overall). The errors of these indicators are therefore also correlated in the model (see Figure 
1). After ensuring a sufficient model quality of the this model overall, the configural, metric 
and scalar equivalent versions of the model are estimated in order to identify whether the 
variables contribute differently to the latent factors for different regions.   
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Results 
 
Life-satisfaction across regions4 
 
For any sort of ranking of regions with regards to levels of life-satisfaction making sense it 
would be necessary to find that there is sufficient variation across those regions. This clearly 
is not the case. As can be seen from Table 2, only a very minor amount of variance is 
actually attributable to between-region variation. Nearly all of the variance rests at the 
individual level. This means that the differences we find between regions here would mainly 
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be attributable to the differences in the composition of individuals in those regions without 
regional controls.5  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
It is not very surprising then that we do not find many of the regions to have statistically 
significant differences in their mean levels of life-satisfaction when running an Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA).6  When checking all possible mean comparisons between each region 
with all other regions, only ‘Northumberland and Tyne and Wear’ showed any statistically 
significant differences to a few other regions (two times at the 5%-level and five times at the 
10%-level). That means that we would be confident to say that the difference between 
Northumberland and Tyne and Wear and those seven other regions in life-satisfaction would 
also be found in the full population based on our sample estimate. In other words 
Northumberland and Tyne and Wear appears to have a significantly higher level of mean life-
satisfaction than the regions with the lowest levels of life-satisfaction. That in turn means 
that all other regions are not statistically different from each other. In other words, based on 
our sample we cannot expect to find differences in mean levels of life-satisfaction between 
35 of 36 regions in this breakdown. Figure 2 illustrates this well. The 95% confidence 
intervals for most regions overlap substantially – meaning that there is a high likelihood that 
the population mean for life-satisfaction of one region falls within the likely range of results 
for the population mean of nearly any other region. In short, at this level of breakdown of 
the UK (NUTS2 classification) we hardly find any differences in mean life-satisfaction 
between regions at all. Reporting a results table with life-satisfaction means, ignoring this 
and therefore suggesting that some regions would have higher levels of life-satisfaction than 
others would be highly misleading – as it may imply actual differences between regions that 
cannot be said to exist based on the data. This however has been done on several occasion 
in ONS analyses (see for example ONS 2013c).     
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Figure 2 about here      
 
When wanting to compare different regions for a particular indicator, for example life-
satisfaction, it is crucial to be able to identify a meaningful level of aggregation. The problem 
with simplistic, orthodox utility-driven approaches is that they often assume a functional 
equivalence of all levels (as outlined above) and therefore are often used without first 
considering the appropriateness of a particular level for the comparison. While there are 
certain levels of aggregation for which mean comparisons of life-satisfaction can be 
meaningful (ONS 2012a), in this example they clearly are not. When investigating measures 
of subjective well-being functional equivalence is not given at different levels of aggregation 
and should not be assumed because of simplistic understandings of well-being and utility.  
 
Configuration of two well-being indicators 
 
Not finding substantial regional-level variation in life-satisfaction across at this breakdown 
does not imply that there are no differences with regards to subjective well-being across 
regions. While life-satisfaction is a useful concept in survey research, it is only one element 
of a wider construct. Several measurements of well-being have been introduced through 
survey batteries, all with different foci. Total levels of certain measures may be interesting, 
but they may not be the only insightful aspect to look at. Apart from varying with regards to 
the level in different regions, a measure may also vary with regards to what factors majorly 
contribute to the establishment of it. In other words, in different contexts different factors 
may be of varying importance for a particular type of subjective well-being. In such an 
analysis we are also able to investigate whether a particular concept can be considered 
equivalent across groups or not.  
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The model presented here explores two different concepts – one based on satisfaction with 
different life domains, investigating to what extent they contribute to an overarching factor 
of SATISFACTION, while the other factor looks at how different forms of subjectively based 
measures of mental and physical well-being reflect a person’s BODY WELL-BEING (BWB). 
When running the model7 without any regional differentiation, the model quality results are 
sufficient to continue the analysis (CFI=0.977, RMSEA=0.036).8 
 
A multi-group model can be tested for configural, metric and scalar equivalence. Configural 
equivalence at the basic level allows us to assume that the general factor structure holds 
across groups, meaning that indeed the three indicators used to constitute each of the two 
factors (SATISFACTION AND BWB) are related to those factors in all regions. Metric 
equivalence implies that factor loadings can be considered equal across groups, meaning 
that the relative importance of indicators for the factors are effectively the same across 
regions. Finally, scalar equivalence allows to assume item intercepts to be the same, 
meaning that the estimation of mean values for each of the two factors would be equivalent 
across regions (thus allowing for comparisons between factor means). Commonly this is 
assessed using chi-square difference testing. However, in order to be able to use weights in 
the model a robust maximum likelihood estimator (MLR) has to be used, for which standard 
chi-square difference testing is inadequate and adjustments are required (Muthén and 
Muthén 2005). Here the log-likelihood value can be used which functions under chi-square 
distribution assumptions after scaling adjustments as suggested by Muthén and Muthén 
(2011).9  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The results of the equivalence test (see Table 3) are in themselves not fully conclusive. The 
metric model is just significantly different from the configural model when applying a 5%-
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significance level and more clearly so when applying a 1%-level. Comparing the scalar to the 
metric level the difference falls just short of being significant at the 5%-level. Considering 
that the model quality results were very good already for our base model without any 
grouping distinction, it is not very surprising to find that the more restrictive models are not 
substantially worse than the configural one regarding model fit. Furthermore, keeping in 
mind the marginal nature of the significance values for the differences, it might be worth 
further exploring whether the difference is mainly attributable to particular regional 
misspecifications and if so, whether a robust partial metric equivalence could be established. 
To summarise the results less technically: They suggest that the two well-being concepts 
presented here (SATISFACTION AND BWB) are rather equivalent across the regions and – 
potentially after some adjustments – could be used in, for example, a multi-level analysis, if 
sufficient variation at the regional level could be established. Having said this, it seems that 
there are some differences between the regions that prevent the assumption of perfect 
equivalence of factor loadings across all of them. It may therefore be insightful to look into 
the differences between the regions with regards to the loadings on the two well-being 
factors (see Tables 4 and 5). In other words we are going to explore whether the 
constitution of the two well-being indicators differs for people in some regions from others, 
as our findings from the equivalence tests suggest, instead of relying on simplistic 
assumptions about equivalence.   
 
Table 4 about here   
 
The comparison of regions according to their factor loadings allows for some interesting 
insights. We do see a substantial number of regions, particularly in the middle of the 
columns that only have very marginal differences between them – probably not warranting 
to consider that factor loadings actually differ between them, which is reflective of the good 
quality of the metric equivalence model, suggesting that in most regions the construction of 
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the well-being indicators is rather similar. However, towards the upper and lower ends we 
find several cases that have larger differences to each other, and therefore also to the 
majority of cases in the middle and the more extreme cases at the other end of the 
spectrum. It seems to usually not be reliant on one single case, so at first sight they do not 
appear to be outliers. Supposedly it is because of these cases that we do find the metric 
model to be significantly worse than the configural one. A closer look at the values for these 
cases therefore can reveal that in some regions certain domains may be more or less 
important in constituting a particular well-being component compared to most other regions.  
 
For example, looking at the Scottish ‘Highlands and Islands’ region, we find that both 
satisfaction with one’s health (0.745) and satisfaction (0.720) with the amount of leisure 
time are much more important variables for SATISFACTION than they are for a very large 
group of other regions (overall values from the base model are 0.652 and 0.649 
respectively). On the other hand, satisfaction with income seems to play a much less 
important role for the ‘Highlands and Islands’ region (0.630) compared to the middle range 
(with a base value of 0.708). However, not only are there some regions that do not fall into 
the middle range, but when they do not, they can follow different patterns: Just like the 
‘Highlands and Islands’ region, Cumbria has a comparatively low score for satisfaction with 
income (0.600). While satisfaction with the amount of leisure time is also at the higher end 
(0.697), satisfaction with health seems to be a more limitedly contributing factor, as Cumbria 
shows the lowest factor loading (0.472) for this item. These findings suggest that indeed 
while there are certain general structures, regional differences in the setup of contributing 
factors to a particular domain of well-being exist and can be analysed. All three items are 
important contributors to SATISFACTION for all regions (all factor loadings are greater than 
0.45). However, which fields of satisfaction are most substantial in constituting overall 
satisfaction varies across the populations of the regions investigated. Domain-based 
satisfaction then is not simply an additive concept, but requires taking into account 
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differences in relative importance. An understanding of satisfaction that simply sums scores 
for satisfaction with certain life domains in all regions would not be reflective of the actually 
existing structures. Personal evaluations of health, income and leisure reflect different 
satisfaction models when properly identified with regards to these regional differences. It 
would therefore not be adequate to use a simplistic utility-driven approach assuming that 
subjective well-being is derived in the same objective way from particular domains or 
factors. 
 
We can find similar types of results also for the BWB measure. North Yorkshire and West 
Yorkshire nearly act as mirror images of each other here. North Yorkshire shows the highest 
contribution of mental well-being (0.895) and subjective general health (0.559) to BWB 
compared to all other regions (with 0.791 and 0.409 as the overall base scores for these 
items), while West Yorkshire is found towards the lower end of each respective scale (0.723 
and 0.339 respectively). For distress the roles are somewhat reversed (though the contrast is 
not as stark) with East Yorkshire -0.706 and West Yorkshire with -0.783. This example also 
highlights that a regional breakdown below larger government region classifications is very 
sensible, as the sub-units within these groupings differ substantially – a finding applicable to 
several cases. East Wales and ‘West Wales and the Valleys’ are rather similar with regards to 
the loading of mental well-being on BWB, however they differ substantially for distress with 
East Wales showing the lowest loading for this item (-0.689) while ‘West Wales and the 
Valleys’ is situated much higher (-0.822). Conducting this sort of analysis helps to investigate 
whether certain types of aggregations are sensible with regards to a particular question. 
From these preliminary findings it would seem at least partially questionable whether it 
makes sense to talk of a domain-based model of satisfaction that contrasts Scotland from 
other larger UK regions, seeing that the three regions operationalised here differ 
substantially with regards to factors contributing to SATISFACTION. Similarly, it would 
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probably be only of limited value to treat all of Yorkshire as one contextual framework for 
which BWB could be treated as a consistent concept.  
 
Discussion 
 
These findings of course have several implications for the analysis of subjective well-being 
indicators used to differentiate regions in the UK. However, the analyses are also limited in 
what they can show at this stage, of course. I have summarised some concerns with the 
ONS national well-being project and now suggest a more sophisticated approach that moves 
beyond utility based models of well-being. 
 
The first part of the empirical section illustrated a very fundamental issue: The existence of 
variation in levels of life-satisfaction does not allow to infer a variation of life-satisfaction at 
just any level of aggregation automatically. In this case we find that the variation in life-
satisfaction is situated completely at the individual level. Differences at NUTS2 regional 
aggregation are reflective of this. Keeping in mind that there is aggregate variation at other 
levels (such as country-level), any level of aggregation must be investigated separately – 
simple utility-based prepositions about functional equivalence at different levels cannot just 
be assumed, but have to be demonstrated to exist. While some of the ONS work and 
subsequent studies have provided regional comparisons that were valid in terms of existing 
variation in relevant indicators of subjective well-being (ONS 2012a), others were not, 
because they compared levels of life-satisfaction between regions that could not be 
considered significantly different from one another (ONS 2012b, p. 18). It may be argued 
that this is not relevant, because the ONS only produces these results as starting points for 
academics to continue the work and perform in-depth analyses with the data provided. 
However, such a response must be considered unsatisfactory, because both of the papers 
mentioned above have been taken up by a wide range of media outlets and gained popular 
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attention. While the first source indeed allows for an apparently distinguishing comparison of 
well-being levels across certain regions with a much more detailed breakdown into smaller 
aggregate units, the latter does not. On its larger-scale breakdown into just a dozen regions 
differences between regions may potentially all be explained by sampling variation. The 
differences could not be argued to be definitive and significant. This of course did not stop 
others using the data to for example to claim that Londoners have substantially lower levels 
of life-satisfaction than the rest of the country (nef 2012) – a claim that could not 
meaningfully be supported by an analysis at this level of societal aggregation.     
 
Patterns of association found at one level cannot simply be transferred to another one 
without testing the applicability thereof. As Adam Smith already noted, society is more than 
its parts. It matters how they are combined and this combination can vary at different 
societal levels. For the NUTS2 regions there is no significant difference between the regions 
with regards to the mean life-satisfaction. Rankings of any sort would thus be meaningless. 
Considering the types of analyses cited in the reports published so far by the ONS, it would 
not be surprising to see graphs like the ones shown as Figure 2 – without the confidence 
intervals and with those regions ranked suggesting that some are happier than others. For 
any such analysis, no matter at what geographic breakdown, the first thing that would have 
to be demonstrated is a sufficient amount of variation and distinction between the respective 
units. Of course, there should be investigations into different levels of aggregation. The 
reason why we do not see any differences may be simply that this paper has not identified 
the most relevant level of societal aggregation. However, so far there was no word about 
such tests and requirements in the documents set out describing the work on this project. It 
needs to become the first step for any analysis that compares UK regions of any sort 
however and the ONS should emphasise through its report how the data generated through 
the project could be used most meaningfully – in an approach that does not rely on simplistic 
utility conceptions, but takes subjective differences seriously. 
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The focus on mean levels of life-satisfaction or other indicators of subjective well-being in 
the ONS project highlights another important issue that gains additional weight after 
identifying the lack in between-region variation. Subjective well-being is usually 
conceptualised in terms of experienced utility, an outcome that can be understood through 
correlation with other factors (such as socio-demographic variables) mainly analysed through 
regression techniques in which it is the dependent variable (see for example Evans 2011). 
That however assumes that subjective well-being is conceptually equivalent in all cases. This 
stands in contrast to the understanding Adam Smith proposes. Subjective orientations are 
not merely characteristics of individuals reflecting differences in other factors, such as socio-
economic standing. Subjective well-being cannot just be analysed in ways that assume it will 
always be at particular levels when other observable characteristics of individuals are the 
same. Instead it is necessary to take into account how the respective measure of subjective 
well-being is constituted and which factors construct it. This understanding that moves 
beyond the simple notion of an objective approach to understanding experienced utility is 
missing from the current state of the ONS project. However, it is essential to properly 
understand how well-being differs across regions, as variation does not occur only with 
regards to levels, but also with regards to composition of what well-being is.  
 
Consequentially, even when there is no variation found with regards to an indicator such as 
life-satisfaction that does not mean that a particular regional framework is meaningless for 
analyses. There are more insightful investigations that can be conducted than comparing 
means between regions. As shown in this paper through a simple example, the precise way 
in which particular indicators contributed to a certain form of subjective well-being at this 
level of aggregation differed to a substantial extent. After showing that there was a general 
configural equivalence between regions – a test that should become a requirement for all 
further comparative analyses with different indicators or at different levels of aggregation – 
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we could identify which NUTS2 regions differed substantially from the majority with regards 
to the exact composition of a specific well-being domain. These sorts of explorations are 
helpful as they allow us to understand to what extent we can consider particular groupings 
as rather homogenous and thus potentially group them together for further analysis or find 
that to do so would be inappropriate.  
 
Of course, the results presented here are far from conclusive. Apart from conducting 
investigations at different levels of aggregation there are many more research opportunities 
that follow from here. More well-being constructs should be explored. A manifold variety of 
them exists and has found its way into different surveys that are applied across the UK. 
Good MGCFA approaches could help us to better understand what domains of well-being 
matter to which people in which contexts and how together they may contribute to an 
overall conception of well-being or a good life. This analysis did not relate the two concepts 
back to life-satisfaction, but of course it would be interesting to explore whether the relation 
is similar for different domains or not.  
 
With good materials and a more extensive set of tried and tested well-being constructs at 
different levels of aggregation there will potentially also be more measures of objective and 
subjective well-being domains that differ substantially between regions as well. The latent 
means of variables from these models could be checked for their between-variation and 
adequate and meaningful rankings could actually be created. Then multi-level modelling 
approaches would make sense and help us not only to identify which regions, counties, 
cities, or other relevant geographical units show higher levels of a particular well-being 
indicator. Much more, we could develop models to aim to identify what systematic aggregate 
factors are associated with these patterns and how they relate to individual-level variables 
distinguishing different persons from each other with regards to the same well-being 
domain. This would actually allow us to develop policy suggestions and use well-being 
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research in a meaningful way by taking subjectivity seriously by incorporating it adequately 
into our understanding of societal processes. Like Adam Smith has shown centuries ago, it is 
sensible to distinguish between individuals and different forms of them coming together 
analytically. Furthermore, it is crucial not only to treat utility and subjective preferences as 
distinct functions, but also to establish their proper relationship to each other, rather than 
assuming that one simply follows the other. Subjective evaluations affect people’s decisions. 
They might follow certain patterns, but those patterns vary across different contexts. In 
order to warrant this attention and elaborate research programs that should be developed, 
the right instruments are required. This is where the engagement with the existing literature 
and the new data in the ONS Measuring National Well-being project disappoints so far 
unfortunately. But as with the initial analyses presented in this paper, there is always room 
for improvement.  
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Tables and Figures   
 
  Table 1: NUTS2 region classification UK 
Code NUTS2  region NUTS1 area  
 
UKC1 Tees Valley and Durham 
North East of England 
UKC2 Northumberland and Tyne and Wear 
UKD1 Cumbria 
North West of England 
UKD2 Cheshire 
UKD3 Greater Manchester 
UKD4 Lancashire 
UKD5 Merseyside 
UKE1 East Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire 
Yorkshire and the Humber 
UKE2 North Yorkshire 
UKE3 South Yorkshire 
UKE4 West Yorkshire 
UKF1 Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire 
East Midlands  UKF2 Leicestershire, Rutland and Northamptonshire 
UKF3 Lincolnshire 
UKG1 Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire 
West Midlands UKG2 Shropshire and Staffordshire 
UKG3 West Midlands 
UKH1 East Anglia 
East of England  UKH2 Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire 
UKH3 Essex 
UKI1 Inner London 
London 
UKI2 Outer London 
UKJ1 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire 
South East of England 
UKJ2 Surrey, East and West Sussex 
UKJ3 Hampshire and Isle of Wight 
UKJ4 Kent 
UKK1 Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath 
South West of England  
UKK2 Dorset and Somerset 
UKK3 Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 
UKK4 Devon 
UKL1 West Wales and The Valleys 
Wales 
UKL2 East Wales 
UKM2 Eastern Scotland 
Scotland* UKM3 South Western Scotland 
UKM6 Highlands and Islands 
UKN0 Northern Ireland Northern Ireland  
*UKM5 (Aberdeen and surroundings) was excluded due to a low case number (N=72) 
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Figure 1: Model visualisation  
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Table 2: Variance components for life-satisfaction 
Variance between regions 0.002 0.01% 
Variance within regions 2.120 99.9% 
Variance total 2.122  
 
Figure 2: Mean scores of life-satisfaction with 95% confidence intervals across UK NUTS2 
regions 
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Table 3: Equivalence testing for MGCFA on SATISFACTION and BWB 
 Log-likelihood Parameters Correction 
factor 
df 
Configural 
Equivalence 
-516897.372 720 3.358 252 
Metric 
Equivalence 
-517174.952 580 3.382 392 
Scalar 
Equivalence  
-517407.987 440 3.574 532 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Test-value   Critical values (∆df=140) 
Metric-Configural 170.369 (p=0.05) 168.61 
(p=0.01) 181.84  Scalar-Metric  167.737 
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Table 4: Ranked factor loadings on SATISFACTION across UK NUTS2 regions  
Satisfaction with Health Satisfaction with Income Satisfaction with Leisure 
East Anglia 0.969 East Wales 0.895 South Western Scotland 0.763 
Kent 0.758 Lincolnshire 0.837 Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath 0.740 
Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire 0.753 Dorset and Somerset 0.826 Highlands and Islands 0.720 
North Yorkshire 0.752 North Yorkshire 0.809 Dorset and Somerset 0.707 
Highlands and Islands 0.745 Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 0.807 Cumbria 0.697 
Leicestershire, Rutland and Northamptonshire 0.743 Cheshire 0.802 North Yorkshire 0.694 
Northern Ireland 0.732 East Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire 0.785 Lancashire 0.692 
Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire 0.726 South Yorkshire 0.754 Hampshire and Isle of Wight 0.689 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire 0.710 West Wales and The Valleys 0.752 Tees Valley and Durham 0.689 
Shropshire and Staffordshire 0.697 Essex 0.749 East Anglia 0.687 
Cheshire 0.696 Eastern Scotland 0.735 West Wales and The Valleys 0.680 
Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 0.694 Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire 0.730 Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire 0.675 
Essex 0.689 West Midlands 0.729 Essex 0.673 
Eastern Scotland 0.688 Hampshire and Isle of Wight 0.725 Leicestershire, Rutland and Northamptonshire 0.670 
Tees Valley and Durham 0.678 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire 0.722 Lincolnshire 0.669 
Inner London 0.672 Leicestershire, Rutland and Northamptonshire 0.720 Greater Manchester 0.647 
West Midlands 0.664 East Anglia 0.719 South Yorkshire 0.647 
Devon 0.663 Lancashire 0.717 Cheshire 0.646 
Surrey, East and West Sussex 0.659 Outer London 0.715 Northumberland and Tyne and Wear 0.645 
West Wales and The Valleys 0.658 Merseyside 0.709 Inner London 0.645 
Greater Manchester 0.654 Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire 0.707 Merseyside 0.643 
Hampshire and Isle of Wight 0.652 Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath 0.704 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire 0.641 
Merseyside 0.638 Greater Manchester 0.699 Surrey, East and West Sussex 0.641 
South Yorkshire 0.629 South Western Scotland 0.697 West Yorkshire 0.639 
East Wales 0.624 Inner London 0.695 Outer London 0.637 
Outer London 0.612 Shropshire and Staffordshire 0.689 West Midlands 0.635 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath 0.609 Tees Valley and Durham 0.688 Shropshire and Staffordshire 0.628 
Northumberland and Tyne and Wear 0.591 Devon 0.682 Eastern Scotland 0.622 
Lincolnshire 0.587 Northern Ireland 0.678 East Wales 0.606 
Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire 0.578 Northumberland and Tyne and Wear 0.674 Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire 0.604 
Dorset and Somerset 0.569 West Yorkshire 0.662 Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire 0.590 
South Western Scotland 0.566 Surrey, East and West Sussex 0.655 Northern Ireland 0.557 
Lancashire 0.559 Highlands and Islands 0.630 Kent 0.556 
West Yorkshire 0.559 Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire 0.603 Devon 0.548 
East Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire 0.491 Cumbria 0.600 Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 0.534 
Cumbria 0.472 Kent 0.539 East Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire 0.528 
Displayed are standardised factor loadings for SATISFACTION ranked from strongest to weakest factor score for the respective region. All factor loadings are statistically significant at the 
0.1%-level. N=37,321 
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Table 5: Ranked factor loadings on BWB across NUTS2 UK regions  
Mental Well-Being Distress  General Health Status 
North Yorkshire 0.895 Cumbria -0.964 North Yorkshire 0.559 
Tees Valley and Durham 0.886 Highlands and Islands -0.935 Shropshire and Staffordshire 0.520 
Kent 0.872 Cornwall and Isles of Scilly -0.899 Highlands and Islands 0.519 
Dorset and Somerset 0.872 Merseyside -0.892 Kent 0.510 
Lancashire 0.858 Devon -0.858 South Yorkshire 0.494 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath 0.847 Northumberland and Tyne and Wear -0.846 Hampshire and Isle of Wight 0.484 
South Yorkshire 0.831 Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire -0.833 Leicestershire, Rutland and Northamptonshire 0.469 
Leicestershire, Rutland and Northamptonshire 0.830 Greater Manchester -0.828 East Anglia 0.455 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire 0.829 West Wales and The Valleys -0.822 Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire 0.454 
Cheshire 0.824 Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire -0.820 Eastern Scotland 0.453 
Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire 0.820 Northern Ireland -0.816 Northumberland and Tyne and Wear 0.451 
Northumberland and Tyne and Wear 0.814 East Anglia -0.813 Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire 0.448 
Hampshire and Isle of Wight 0.812 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire -0.813 Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 0.436 
Shropshire and Staffordshire 0.808 Shropshire and Staffordshire -0.808 East Wales 0.433 
East Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire 0.803 Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath -0.803 Greater Manchester 0.432 
Outer London 0.803 Eastern Scotland -0.801 Outer London 0.432 
Northern Ireland 0.802 Inner London -0.799 Northern Ireland 0.430 
West Midlands 0.800 Hampshire and Isle of Wight -0.798 Merseyside 0.419 
East Anglia 0.800 South Yorkshire -0.797 Lincolnshire 0.415 
Devon 0.798 Lincolnshire -0.793 Lancashire 0.399 
Greater Manchester 0.797 Leicestershire, Rutland and Northamptonshire -0.784 Surrey, East and West Sussex 0.399 
Lincolnshire 0.797 West Yorkshire -0.783 Inner London 0.398 
South Western Scotland 0.796 Essex -0.783 West Midlands 0.391 
Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire 0.793 West Midlands -0.772 South Western Scotland 0.386 
East Wales 0.786 Outer London -0.771 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire 0.385 
Inner London 0.781 South Western Scotland -0.769 Cheshire 0.381 
Merseyside 0.737 Cheshire -0.751 Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath 0.371 
West Wales and The Valleys 0.728 Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire -0.744 West Wales and The Valleys 0.357 
Essex 0.726 Surrey, East and West Sussex -0.740 Dorset and Somerset 0.345 
West Yorkshire 0.723 Lancashire -0.731 Tees Valley and Durham 0.331 
Cumbria 0.720 Tees Valley and Durham -0.719 West Yorkshire 0.339 
Surrey, East and West Sussex 0.715 North Yorkshire -0.718 Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire 0.321 
Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 0.690 Dorset and Somerset -0.707 Devon 0.317 
Eastern Scotland 0.676 East Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire -0.706 Cumbria 0.308 
Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire 0.655 Kent -0.698 Essex 0.267 
Highlands and Islands 0.540 East Wales -0.689 East Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire 0.227 
Displayed are standardised factor loadings for BWB ranked from strongest to weakest factor score for the respective region. All factor loadings are statistically significant at the 0.1%-level 
(with the exception of East Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire for General Health Status being significant at the 5%-level). N=37,321 
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1 The measures used by the ONS are life-satisfaction, happiness, anxiety and evaluations of the life as worthwhile.  
2 Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) allows to investigate how particular items relate to a hypothesised underlying factor (the latent variable) without assuming 
any relationship with a particular dependent. Through CFA modelling multiple factors can be estimated simultaneously. Errors are not disregarded, but modelled 
and their correlation can be modelled to account for collinearity between items. Using a multi-group approach (MGCFA) furthermore allows to analyse whether 
the composition of the hypothesised factors is equivalent across all groups compared (here regions) or whether there are differences that can be explored (Byrne 
2012, pp. 193).   
3 The author acknowledges that both latent variables here are simplifications of more complex concepts with varying practices of engagement by different 
scholars. The factors are kept simple for this analysis as the main focus of this engagement is the illustration of how one could conduct such differentiating 
analyses, not the specific results for these particular empirical domains.  
4  Calculations done using SPSS 17.  
5 This is not the case for all levels of aggregation (in a study of life-satisfaction across European and Anglo-Saxon countries for example, Eichhorn (2012a) found 
over 20% of variance in life-satisfaction at the country level).  
6 In an ANOVA we investigate how large the differences in a particular variable (here: mean life-satisfaction) between certain groups (here: people living in a 
particular region) – the variation across these regions – is and whether differences found between particular groups are significant or have a high chance of 
being results of sampling uncertainty and errors.  Results from the post-hoc test are based on Tamhane’s T2 test, as homogeneity of variance assumptions were 
not met and a non-parametric test was required.  
7  All MGCFA computations were done using MPLUS 6.11.  
8 The results reported here are standard model quality measures for the analytical approach used and they meet appropriate thresholds considered as indicators 
for good model quality, based on a variety of empirical and simulation studies. There were some suggested modification indices relating in particular to some 
error correlations between indicators, but none were very substantial, like the health satisfaction-health status one accounted for as discussed earlier. 
Considering the good model quality the theoretical model was therefore applied for the remaining analysis.   
9 The suggested approach is to calculate a adjustment factor cd specified as cd=(p0*c0 –p1*c1)/(p0-p1), with p-number of parameters and c-scaling correction 
factor. Finally, the difference test value TRd is calculated as TRd= -2*(L0 – L1)/cd, with L-log-likelihood value.  
